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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes among family members over the proceeds of estates can
be among the most fractious and antagonistic of conflicts. In a typical
case a lawyer is approached within weeks after the death of the dece-
dent by a relative, angry because she has received less than expected.
The lawyer retained by the executor to defend a will may often have a
client who is similarly exasperated that the contestant would dare
trample on the last wishes of the deceased. In this atmosphere the
lawyers for both proponent and contestant must be able to properly
assess the merits (and financial practicalities) of bringing and defend-
ing an action known as a will contest.
With this background in mind, this article addresses from a practi-
cal standpoint the substantive defects sufficient to invalidate a will, as
well as related proceedings to establish rights in the proceeds of a
decedent's estate.2 Part II provides a brief outline of the West Virgin-
ia probate system. Part III discusses the procedural, substantive, and
strategic aspects involved in bringing will contests. Lastly, Part IV
discusses related actions which the practitioner should recognize when
evaluating a potential case.
1. This article will use the term "will contest" to refer to both litigation involving
the impeachment of a will and litigation concerning the validity of competing wills.
2. This article is not intended to be an exhaustive compilation of the substantive law
af this area, but rather it is intended to serve as a primer for the novice or infrequent
practitioner in this area of law.
[Vol. 96:123
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H. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WEST VIRGINIA PROBATE SYSTEM
In West Virginia, jurisdiction to probate wills lies in the County
Commission. 3 West Virginia Code section 41-5-4 specifies the venue
for probate of the will of a resident decedent according to a hierarchy
as follows: (1) the county where the decedent had his residence; (2) a
county where any real estate is situated; (3) the county where the
decedent died; or (4) a county where the decedent had any property at
the time of his death. The probate of a non-resident's will lies in any
county were the decedent had property. In West Virginia, there are
two procedures for probating a will: solemn form and ex parte.
Formal probate is known as solemn form. To start the procedure,
an interested person files with the County Commission having jurisdic-
tion a duly verified petition which states: (1) when and where the
testator died; (2) his last place of residence; (3) the nature of his es-
tate; and, (4) the relationship to the decedent and the residence of all
heirs at law, beneficiaries under the will, and the surviving spouse.'
Process is then issued by the County Clerk and served upon all the
interested parties requiring them to appear at the scheduled hearing and
to show cause why the will should not be admitted to probate.6 A
guardian ad litem must be appointed for any parties under disability,
such as minors.7 Before entry of a probate order, any interested party
may file a notice of contest, and further process is then issued on this
notice. At the final hearing, the County Commission enters an order
admitting the will to probate or refusing it.9
A simpler procedure for probate is known as ex parte. Any person
may move the County Commission for probate of a will without notice
3. See W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6; W. VA. CODE
§ 7-1-3 (Supp. 1993). The County Commission was formerly called the County Court, and
the West Virginia Code still contains references to the old name.
4. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-4 (1982).
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to any other party. 0 The motion for ex parte probate is made orally,
and no formal written motion is required. The informal, ex parte pro-
cedure is the usual method of probate used in West Virginia."
III. ATTACKING THE WILL
A. The West Virginia Impeachment Statute
1. Jurisdiction, Venue, Scope, and Parties
Interested persons who were not parties to an ex parte or solemn
form probate proceeding may seek to impeach a will under the appeal
provisions of 'West Virginia Code section 41-5-11.12 A proceeding
filed under this section is known as an issue devisavit vel non,13 and
jurisdiction is in the circuit court. 4 An issue devisavit vel non must
be filed in circuit court within one year after the will was admitted to
or denied probate by the County Commission. 5 If the will was ad-
mitted to or denied probate upon appeal to the circuit court, the statute
of limitations is one year from the entry of the circuit court order.'
6
Venue is proper in the county where the will was admitted or denied
probate. 17
10. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-10 (1982).
11. See In re Winzenrith's Will, 55 S.E.2d 897, 902 (W. Va. 1949). For a more
detailed description of the probate process see Karl Warden, Note, Description of West
Virginia's New Probate System, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 393 (1983).
12. The term "appeal" is a misnomer since the circuit court will entertain the action
on a de novo basis.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 407 (5th ed. 1979), defines devisavit vel non as:
The name of an issue sent out of a court of chancery, or one which exercises
chancery jurisdiction, to a court of law, to try the validity of a paper asserted and
denied to be a will, to ascertain whether or not the testator did devise, or whether
or not that paper was his will.
Id.
14. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11 (Supp. 1993).
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West Virginia Code section 41-5-11 (1982) provides that the only
issue the court may entertain is the validity of the purported will. In
addition, the Code section authorizes the court to "require all other
testamentary papers of the decedent to be produced" in order to try
their validity as well.18 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia ("Supreme Court") has also held that, in an action filed under
this section, the court may construe the provisions of the will. 19 The
circuit court will treat an issue of devisavit vel non the same as any
other civil action, so the Rules of Civil Procedure apply.20 Any party
may demand a jury trial.21 As in any other civil action, the circuit
court's judgment may be appealed to the West Virginia Supreme
Court.
2 2
In a proper case which meets the requirements of diversity juris-
diction,23 a West Virginia will contest may be brought in the United
States District Court.24 Federal jurisdiction lies because in West Vir-
ginia the will contest is brought in the state court of general jurisdic-
tion as a suit inter partes.' The proper party defendants to a will
contest are all named beneficiaries under the contested will and all
heirs at law.26 Furthermore, the will beneficiaries are indispensable parties.27
18. Id.
19. Miller v. Robinson, 301 S.E.2d 610, 612-13 (W. Va. 1983).
20. Id. at 613.
21. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11 (Supp. 1993).
22. See W. VA. R.A.P., Rule 1.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
24. See Osborne v. Campbell, 37 F.R.D. 339 (S.D.W. V. 1965) (accepting diversity
jurisdiction without any discussion). For two unreported decisions specifically accepting
diversity jurisdiction, see also Marjorie Jane Wright v. One Valley Bank, et al. (S.D.W. Va.
Civil Action No. 2:88-0471) (order entered May 1, 1991); Mauna Lisalee Schreier v. John
Falbo, Jr., et al. (S.D.W. Va. Civil Action No. 2:92-0175) (order entered March 31, 1993).
25. Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199 (1918); see generally, Ronald I. Mirvis, J.D.,
Annotation, Modern Status of Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), of
Diversity Actions Affecting Probate or Other Matters Concerning Administration of
Decedent's Estates, 61 A.L.R. FED. 536 (1983); 3 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARK-
ER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 26.21 (1961) [hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS].
26. Osborne, 37 F.R.D. 339 (dealing with will beneficiaries); Thomas v. Best, 161
S.E.2d 803, 808 (Va. 1968) (holding that unjoined heirs at law are permitted to re-open
issue devisavit vel non).
27. Osborne, 37 F.R.D. at 341 (explaining that the case was decided under FED. R.
Civ. P. 19 which is essentially the same as W. VA. R.C.P., Rule 19).
1993]
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2. Standing
Only "interested" persons who were not parties to the prior ex
parte proceeding or those parties to the solemn form proceeding who
did not receive proper notice may bring an issue devisavit vel non.28
A person is interested if her interest is affected by the will.29 Thus,
heirs at law have standing to bring the action. 30 Children of the dece-
dent are interested parties31 and include illegitimate children32 and
adopted children.33 Distributees under a prior will are also interested
persons with standing.' The factual basis for a party's interest must
be affirmatively alleged in the complaint.35
B. Grounds of Attack
There are relatively few ways to successfully attack a will. The
simplest way to void a will results from the testator's failure to follow
the formalities required by the will statute. If all formalities have been
observed the will is said to have been "duly executed" and is valid
unless the testator later revokes the will, lacked capacity to execute it,
28. W. VA. CODE § 41-5-11 (Supp. 1993).
29. Childers v. Milam, 70 S.E. 118, 119 (W. Va. 1911).
30. Id.; see also Jackson v. Jackson, 99 S.E. 259, 261 (W. Va. 1919).
31. Ropar v. Ropar, 88 S.E. 834, 837 (W. Va. 1916); see also W. VA. CODE § 41-4-
1 to -2 (1982). Under W. VA. CODE § 41-4-1, an independent ground exists for a "preter-
mitted" child to lay claim to a share of an estate. If the testator executes a will when he
has no child then living and a child is subsequently born, such pretermitted child succeeds
to an intestate share if the child is "not provided for or mentioned" in the will. Similarly,
under W. VA. CODE § 41-4-2, if the testator has a child living when he executes a will
and another child is subsequently born, such after-born child or his descendants succeed to
an intestate share "if not provided for by any settlement, and neither provided for nor ex-
pressly excluded by the will, but only pretermitted." The pretermitted child's share is paid
by all devises and legatees who contribute ratably. Id. §§ 41-4-1 to -2.
32. See W. VA. CODE § 42-1-5 (1982) as judicially reformed by Adkins v.
McEldowney, 280 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1981); see also Moore v. Goode, 375 S.E.2d 549,
553-54 (N. Va. 1988).
33. Morgan v. Mayes, 296 S.E.2d 34, 35 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that adopted chil-
dren shall have rights equal to the rights of natural children).
34. Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23, 49 (1882) (explaining that every person who
will be affected by the will should have the opportunity to be heard).
35. Jackson v. Jackson, 99 S.E. at 261 (requiring that "the plaintiffs interest ought to
be set forth in the bill.").
(Vol. 96:123
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or executed it because of fraud, mistake, or undue influence. This Part
introduces each of these grounds in ascending order of their relative
difficulty of proof.
1. Due Execution: The Formal Requirements
The practitioner wishing to attack a will should first determine if
the formalities of execution were followed. A testator's failure to fol-
low the formal requirements for execution of a will constitutes grounds
to set aside the will. There are five basic formalities for a valid will
in West Virginia:
(1) The testator must be of legal age;
(2) He must have testamentary intent;
(3) The will must be in writing;
(4) The testator must sign the will; and




The testator must be at least eighteen years of age to make a
will.37 The will statute makes no distinction between classes of prop-
erty, and an eighteen year old may dispose of both real property and
personal property by his will.
38
b. Testamentary Intent
The testator must execute the instrument with testamentary intent
(animus testandi).39 Testamentary intent means that the testator must
intend for the instrument to be a will-that is, to dispose of property
upon his death.4° When a testator has used an attorney to prepare a
will, the question of lack of testamentary intent normally will not
36. See W. VA. CODE §§ 41-1-2 and 41-1-3 (1982).
37. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-2 (1982).
38. See W. VA. CODE § 41-1-1 (1982).
39. In re Brigg's Estate, 134 S.E.2d 737, 741 (W. Va. 1964) (holding that "testamen-
tary intent is essential to the validity of a will.").
40. Langfitt v. Langfitt, 151 S.E. 715, 717 (W. Va. 1930).
1993]
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arise.4' The problem generally arises with informal, holographic acts
of the alleged testator.42
c. In Writing
Except for one limited exception,43 a will must be in writing. 
44
Writing includes printing, typewriting, or writing with a lead pencil.4
If the physical "writing" cannot be located at the testator's death, it
may still be possible to probate a "lost will. '46 To prove a lost will
the proponent must establish by clear and convincing evidence (1) the
due execution of the will; (2) the impossibility of producing the origi-
nal; (3) its contents; and (4) its non-revocation by the testator.47
d. Signed by Testator
West Virginia Code section 41-1-3 (1982) requires that the will be
"signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and
by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name
is intended as a signature." As long as the testator intends his name to
be a signature, he may sign a will by his initials.48 Signing by mark
is valid.49 In West Virginia, a will need not be signed at the end.5
Assistance by another in steadying the hand of an infirm testator will
not invalidate the will." Surprisingly, the will statute permits a third
person to sign for the testator at the testator's direction and in his
presence.
5 2
41. But see infra part III.B.4.
42. See Hunt v. Furman, 52 S.E.2d 816, 818 (W. Va. 1949) (explaining that writing
on an envelope could be a will).
43. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-5 (1982) (providing that a soldier in actual military service
or a seaman at sea may make an oral will).
44. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982).
45. LaRue v. Lee, 60 S.E. 388, 390 (W. Va. 1908).
46. See Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113 (1886).
47. 14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACrS, Lost and Destroyed Wills § 1 (1964).
48. In re Brigg's Estate, 134 S.E.2d at 741.
49. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S.E.2d 346, 351 (Va. 1948) (noting that "[w]here the
testator puts his mark to the subscription of his name to his will . . . this is a sufficient
signing within the meaning of our statute.").
50. Black v. Maxwell, 46 S.E.2d 804, 809 (W. Va. 1948).
51. McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W. Va. 683, 707 (1881).
52. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982); see Peake v. Jenkins, 80 Va. 293, 297 (1885)
(noting that the will was signed "Anna L. Jenkins By Mary F. Holladay").
[Vol. 96:123
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e. Witnesses
Unless the will is wholly in the testator's handwriting (a holo-
graph), his signature must "be made or the will acknowledged by him
in the presence of at least two competent witnesses, present at the
same time; and such witnesses shall subscribe the will in the presence
of the testator, and of each other.
'5 3
The West Virginia will statute requires only two witnesses.54 The
witnesses must be present at the same time and must sign the will in
the presence of both the testator and each other.5  As used in the
statute the word "presence" means "conscious presence," and the testa-
tor need not see the actual signing but must merely be aware that it is
happening. 6 The witnesses need not know the contents of the will,
5 7
but must intend to attest the will as witnesses.5 8
Both witnesses to the will must be "competent." 59 Competency is
determined at the time of the execution of the will.' Creditors and
executors may be witnesses to the testator's will.61 No minimum age
for witnesses is specified in the West Virginia will statute. Prudence,
however, requires that the witnesses should be at least eighteen years
of age.
In West Virginia, beneficiaries under a will may be witnesses-but
at their own peril. An attesting witness, or such witness' spouse, who
receives a beneficial interest in the estate is a competent witness, but
53. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982).
54. Id. Only two states require more than two witnesses. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 1579-1582 (West 1952) (requiring 2 to 7 witnesses depending on the type of will); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5 (1992) (requiring 3 witnesses). It is a common practice among
some practitioners to have three witnesses to the will in case one witness is later deter-
mined to be disqualified.
55. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982); see Barker v. Hinton, 59 S.E. 614, 615 (W. Va.
1907).
56. Nock v. Nock's Ex'r, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 106 (1853).
57. Freeman v. Freeman, 76 S.E. 657, 658 (W. Va. 1912).
58. Robinson v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 735, 739 (Va. 1990).
59. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (1982).
60. Bruce v. Shuler, 62 S.E. 973, 975 (Va. 1908).
61. W. VA. CODE §§ 41-2-2 and 41-2-3 (1982).
1993]
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the devise or bequest to such witness will be void.62 If the witness is
entitled to an intestate share, however, the devise or bequest will be
saved to that extent.63
The primary purpose of the witness requirement is to prevent
fraud.64 Witnesses also serve the secondary function of providing evi-
dence of the testator's mental capacity. Counsel for the testator should
therefore ensure that the witnesses talk with the testator before the
execution ceremony in order to assess his mental state.65 The drafting
attorney may act as witness, and in a will contest, his testimony will
be given great weight.66 The rules of legal ethics, however, may re-
strict the draftsman-witness from handling estate litigation. Rule 3.7(a)
of West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provides that a lawyer
shall not "act as advocate at a trial" where the lawyer is likely to be
called as a witness.67
2. Revocation and Revival of Wills
Even if the formalities of execution as discussed above have been
followed, the practitioner should determine if the challenged will was
revoked. West Virginia Code section 41-1-7 (1982) provides that a will
is revoked
by a subsequent will or codicil, or by some writing declaring an intention
to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a will is re-
quired to be executed, or by the testator, or some other person in his
presence and by his direction, cutting, tearing, burning, obliterating, cancel-
ing or destroying the same, or the signature thereto, with the intent to
revoke.
62. W. VA. CODE § 41-2-1 (1982).
63. Id.
64. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S.E.2d 346, 352 (Va. 1948).
65. See Forehand v. Sawyer, 136 S.E. 683, 688 (Va. 1927).
66. Prichard v. Prichard, 65 S.E.2d 65, 68 (W. Va. 1951).
67. The Rule represents a liberalization of the former Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and merely restricts the attorney from acting as trial advocate. The former Code dis-
qualified the lawyer-witness in all further representation. See Matter of Estate of Seegers,
733 P.2d 418, 424 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that an attorney who witnessed the will
cannot represent an estate when the attorney will be called as a witness).
[Vol. 96:123
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This Code section provides the only methods for revoking a will.
68
A will may be revoked by an express revocation executed in the
same manner required to make a valid will. 69 A separate instrument
of revocation is uncommon since easier methods of revocation exist.
Generally, a new will will contain the express recital that the testator
"hereby revokes any and all other wills and codicils previously made."
A second will revokes a prior will without express terms when the
provisions of the second instrument make a different disposition of the
estate from that made by the first will.7'
Physical acts by the testator coupled with intent will revoke a
will.7 To revoke, the act of the testator in cutting, tearing, burning,
obliterating, canceling, or destroying must be conscious and purposeful
as opposed to mistaken or accidental! 2 If the physical act of destruc-
tion is not done by the testator, revocation only occurs if the act is
done in testator's presence and at his direction.73 A rebuttable pre-
sumption that the testator revoked his will arises when the mutilated
instrument is found in the testator's possession at the time of his
death.74
A change in marital status may act as a partial revocation of a
will. After June 5, 1992, if a testator is divorced or the marriage is
annulled after execution of a will, the divorce or annulment revokes
the will but only to the extent of any disposition of property to the
former spouse, any provision conferring a power of appointment on the
former spouse, and any nomination of the former spouse as a fiducia-
ry.75 Provisions revoked by divorce or annulment are revived by the
testator's remarriage to the former spouse.76 Prior to June 5, 1992,
the West Virginia Code provided that a will was revoked by the
68. Swann v. Swann, 48 S.E.2d 425, 428 (W. Va. 1948).
69. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-7 (1982).
70. Kearns v. Roush, 146 S.E. 729, 730 (W. Va. 1929).
71. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-7 (1982).
72. In re Estate of Siler, 187 S.E.2d 606, 616 (W. Va. 1972).
73. See W. VA. CODE § 41-1-7 (1982).
74. Canterberry v. Canterberry, 197 S.E. 809, 812 (W. Va. 1938).
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testator's subsequent marriage, annulment, or divorce unless such will
"makes provision therein for such contingency. 77
An invalid will can be validated by a duly executed codicil.78
West Virginia Code section 41-1-8 (1982) provides that a will or codi-
cil which has been revoked shall not be revived except "by the re-exe-
cution thereof, or by a codicil executed in the manner hereinabove re-
quired, and then only to the extent to which an intention to revive the
same is shown." Accordingly, a will which has been revoked by a
subsequent will is not revived by the testator's later revocation of the
second will.
79
Interlineations and erasures in an attested will are invalid.8" If the
alterations are extensive enough, the entire instrument may be invali-
dated.8
3. Lack of Testamentary Capacity
If the will has been duly executed and not subsequently revoked,
the practitioner should next explore perhaps the most common ground
for challenging a will-that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.
A person of "unsound mind" is incapable of making a will. 2 The
test of testamentary capacity requires that the testator be capable of
understanding (1) the nature and consequences of his act, (2) the prop-
erty to be disposed, and (3) the objects of his bounty. 3 In addition,
the testator must hold such knowledge in his mind a sufficient length
of time to be able to form some rational judgment in relation to
them.84
77. Id.
78. Hatcher v. Hatcher, 80 Va. 169, 173 (1885).
79. West Virginia apparently does not recognize the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation which permits a revoked will to be revived when the testator cancelled it with
the present intention of creating a new will which he failed to do. See In re Estate of
Siler, 187 S.E.2d at 615 (Carrigan, J., finding the doctrine "untenable"); but cf. Nelson v.
Ratliffe, 69 S.E.2d 217, 222 (1952) (noting the existence of dependent relative revocation).
80. See generally, 2 PAGE ON WILLS § 22.3 (1960).
81. See Triplett's Ex'r v. Triplett, 172 S.E. 162, 165 (Va. 1934).
82. W. VA. CODE § 41-1-2 (1982).
83. Samuel v. Marshall, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 567 (1832); Payne v. Payne, 125 S.E. 818
(W. Va. 1924); Kerr v. Lunsford, 8 S.E. 493 (W. Va. 1888).
84. Kerr, 8 S.E. at 504.
[Vol. 96:123
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In West Virginia, it requires less mental capacity to make a will
than to make a deed or contract.8 5 Testamentary capacity is deter-
mined at the time the will is executed.86 The test of mental capacity
is liberal, and the physical condition of the testator will usually not
deprive him of the power to dispose of his property on death. Even an
insane individual may execute a will during a "lucid period."' 7 Exam-
ples of particular infirmities that, standing alone, will not deprive a
testator of mental capacity are noted in the footnote. 8
A will is invalid if executed while the testator is affected by an
"insane delusion." To destroy testamentary capacity, the insane delu-
sion must affect the will and influence the testator to dispose of his
property in a manner which he would not do in the absence of the
delusion. 9 When the testator's false belief is not based on evidence,
it amounts to an insane delusion, but if the belief is founded upon evi-
dence, however slight or inconclusive, the delusion is not insane and
the will will stand.90
4. Fraud, Mistake and Undue Influence
After considering the testamentary capacity of the testator, the
practitioner should investigate whether grounds of fraud, mistake, or
undue influence exist to render the will void.91 Fraud and mistake
85. Id. at 508, n.2.
86. Nicholas v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251 (1882).
87. See generally I PAGE ON WILLS § 12.36 (1960).
88. Gilmer v. Brown, 44 S.E.2d 16 (Va. 1947) (recognizing that an individual under a
guardianship is not deprived of the power to make a will); Boyd v. Cook, 30 Va. (3
Leigh) 32 (1831) (holding that a blind man may make a will); see Temple v. Temple, 11
Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 476 (1807) (holding that drug addiction is not sufficient to establish
lack of testamentary capacity); Frye v. Norton, 135 S.E.2d 603 (V. Va. 1964) (indicating
that alcoholism is not sufficient to establish lack of testamentary capacity); Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 128 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1962) (noting that old age, standing alone, does not
invalidate the capacity to make a will); Nicholas v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251 (1882) (hold-
ing that physical infirmities or disease alone are not sufficient to invalidate testamentary
capacity).
89. Eason v. Eason, 123 S.E.2d 361 (Va. 1962).
90. See generally I HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION FOR VIRGINIA AND
WEST VIRGINIA, § 123(11) (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter HARRISON].
91. Fraud, mistake, or undue influence, however, may affect only a portion of the will
and not the entire instrument, and in such a case only the affected portion will be held
invalid, unless the valid portions cannot be carried out without the stricken portions. See,
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affect testamentary intent, whereas undue influence affects testamentary
capacity.
Fraud occurs when a testator is misled into executing a will which
he does not know to be a will or which does not say what he thinks
it says.9 2 Ordinarily, the party alleging fraud bears the burden of
proof, and the standard is clear and convincing evidence. 93 However,
the burden may shift to the person accused of fraud where a trust or
confidential relationship exists.94 If fraud is proven, the court may
either set aside the will or, in appropriate cases, decree a constructive
trust.95
A court may set aside a will on the grounds of mistake, but only
if it is a mistake as to what the instrument contains, or as to the paper
itself.96 In limited circumstances the court may also construe the will
in accordance with the intentions of the testator.97 These situations
are typically limited to "descriptions of property, designation of benefi-
ciaries, and the like, which arise upon the construction to be given to
the will. 9 8 A mistake of fact or law upon which a testator relies in
making his will cannot be corrected by the court. 99 As with fraud, the
burden of proof for mistake is clear and convincing evidence.1°
Unlike fraud and mistake, the theory of undue influence is con-
cerned not with the testator's intentions, but with his very capacity to
execute the will. The facts necessary to establish undue influence will
e.g., Hooper v. Wood, 125 S.E. 350 (W. Va. 1924).
92. See generally Hooe v. Kelsick, 2 Va. (Wythe) 190 (1793).
93. Ward v. Ward, 387 S.E.2d 460 (Va. 1990); Quality Bedding Co. v. American
Credit Indem. Co. of N.Y., 145 S.E.2d 468 (W. Va. 1965).
94. Ralphsnyder v. Titus, 82 S.E. 257 (W. Va. 1914).
95. Sprinkle v. Hayworth, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 384 (1875).
96. Couch v. Eastham, 27 W. Va. 796 (1887); Effinger v. Hall, 81 Va. 94 (1885).
97. Effinger, 81 Va. at 98.
98. HARRISON, supra note 90, § 115. For example, in Effinger v. Hall, the court cor-
rected the testator's mistake where the testator's will divided certain property among seven
persons when the testator intended the property to be divided among eight. But cf Couch v.
Eastham, 3 S.E. 23 (W. Va. 1887).
99. Martin v. Thayer, 16 S.E. 489 (W. Va. 1892); Couch v. Eastham, 27 W. Va. 796
(1886).
100. 13A M.J., Mistake and Accident, § 13 (1991).
[Vol. 96:123
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vary from case to case. 10 Undue influence sufficient to invalidate a
will is defined as "such influence as destroys the free agency of the
testator and, in legal effect, amounts to force or coercion. Force and
coercion necessary to invalidate a will, however, need not be physical
or applied at any particular time."'0 2 The burden of proving undue
influence is upon the party who alleges it.'03 As with fraud and mis-
take, the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence'0 4
In some circumstances a presumption of constructive fraud or
undue influence may be raised. The West Virginia Supreme Court has
adopted a presumption of undue influence in certain circumstances. In
the case of Frye v. Norton,'05 an attorney was accused of undue in-
fluence when the will of the testatrix left her estate to him. The trial
court instructed the jury over the objection of the defendant that:
[W]hile the burden of proving fraud and undue influence in a contested
will case ordinarily rests upon the contestants, this is not the rule if an
attorney who represents the testatrix writes or procures the writing and
execution of the will and is a beneficiary of a substantial amount under
the will, and would not share in the estate except for the will, in which
event there is a presumption and suspicion of fraud and undue influence
which the burden of overcoming is upon the proponent of the will."°
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court implicitly approved of
the presumption. The court in Frye approved the above instruction but
held that it constituted reversible error because it was not supported by
the evidence in the case.'07
Our sister state of Virginia has also clearly adopted the presump-
tion of undue influence. To raise the presumption, the evidence must
show that:
101. See HARRISON, supra note 90, § 127.
102. Ritz v. Kingdon, 79 S.E.2d 123 (W. Va. 1953).
103. Frye v. Norton, 135 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1964).
104. See Ritz, 79 S.E.2d at 144-45; see also Abstract, Wills-Weight of the Evidence in
Proving Undue Influence, 67 W. VA. L. REV. 265 (1965) (citing 9 JOHN MERRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2498 (1940)).
105. 135 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1964).
106. Id. at 611.
107. Id. (noting that the attorney-beneficiary in Frye had not prepared the will. Another
attorney had drafted it).
1993]
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(1) The testator was enfeebled in mind when the will was
executed;
(2) The will was procured or prepared by a person in a confi-
dential or fiduciary relationship to the testator; and
(3) The testator had previously expressed a different testamen-
tary intent.0 8
Persons in a "confidential or fiduciary relationship" to the testator
are typically family members, business partners, and attorneys. In
addition, a power of attorney creates a fiduciary relationship between
the grantor and grantee of the power."
Moreover, the presumption of undue influence (also called con-
structive fraud) is a general principle of fiduciary law in West Virgin-
ia. In Kanawha Valley Bank v. Friend ° the West Virginia Supreme
Court explained:
A corollary to the fiduciary principle is the rule that a presumption of
fraud arises where the fiduciary is shown to have obtained any benefit
from the fiduciary relationship, as stated in 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and
Deceit § 441:
".. . if he seeks to support the transaction, he must assume the burden of
proof that he has taken no advantage of his influence or knowledge and
that the arrangement is fair and conscientious.'
The presumption of constructive fraud discussed in Friend in-
volved joint bank accounts. The court has also established the pre-
sumption in other situations." Once established, the burden is upon
the will proponent to overcome the presumption of constructive fraud
"by clear and satisfactory evidence."
11 3
108. Jarvis v. Tonkin, 380 S.E.2d 900 (Va. 1989) (will contest); Martin v. Phillips 369
S.E.2d 397 (Va. 1988) (will and deed contest); 79 AM. JUR. 2d, Wills, §§ 428-29 (1975)
(numerous citations omitted).
109. Kanawha Valley Bank v. Friend, 253 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1979).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 530.
112. See Galloway v. Cinello, 423 S.E.2d 875 (W. Va. 1992) (notary public and deed
of trust); Work v. Rogerson, 160 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1968) (declaration of trust); see also
Vercellotti v. Bowen, 371 S.E.2d 371 (W. Va. 1988) (joint bank account case).
113. Friend, 253 S.E.2d at 531 (approving the holding of Nicholson v. Shockey, 64
[Vol. 96:123
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Because proof of fraud and undue influence are so fact dependent
and since the burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence, the
ability to invoke the presumption of constructive fraud or undue influ-
ence can often be a critical factor in successfully challenging a will on
either of these grounds.
C. Strategic Considerations
Once the decision to bring a will contest has been made, the
contestant's attorney may quickly realize that the parties' relative fi-
nancial positions are not on an equal footing, especially when the
proponent-defendant is in control of the estate's assets. Moreover, there
may be a genuine fear that a party who is also the executor may lay
waste to the estate before the case can wind its way through the
courts. In addition, the size of the potential client's inheritance if a
contest is successful may be so small as to make the attorney's accep-
tance financially impractical.
In light of these considerations, this section discusses some strate-
gic moves the contestant's attorney should consider as well as options
for enlarging the pool from which the attorney can collect a fee if
successful.
1. Removing the Executor
If the defendant in the will contest has been appointed executor,
the contestant should consider removing him and having a neutral fidu-
ciary appointed to control the estate. West Virginia Code section 44-1-
5 (1982) provides that the County Commission "may appoint a curator
of the estate of a decedent, during a contest about his will . . . taking
from him a bond in a reasonable penalty." The curator is in essence a
temporary fiduciary who is empowered to control an estate during a
will contest.
114
S.E.2d 813 (Va. 1951)).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court enunciated the standard for
placement of a curator in the case of Moore v. Thomas:1
5
In our opinion, the statute contemplates that, pending the contest and pend-
ing the determination of the rights of rival claimants, the administration of
the estate is, by the appointment of a curator, to be placed in competent
hands that will be impartial and even-handed as between the conflicting
interests of the parties contesting the will.
The court in Moore ruled that "a proper case has been made out for
the removal of a [fiduciary]" if the two averments in the plaintiff's
petition were sustained by proof." 6 The first averment in Moore was
that the fiduciary was "one of the contesting parties in the contest of
the will.""17 The second averment was that the fiduciary "would be
required to reduce to possession assets in his hands as attorney in
fact."'"18 The court went on to hold that the mere fact that a party is
a contestant of the will gives him standing to remove the executor." 9
By removing the executor, the contestant may be able to remove the
"war chest" from the proponent's hands by requiring him to fund his
defense of the will contest out of his own pocket.
2. Requiring Bond
If the contestant does not wish to remove the executor or feels
that the grounds for removal are weak, an alternative strategy is to
petition the County Commission to require or enlarge the executor's
fiduciary bond. Typically, the challenged will contains a clause waiv-
ing bond for the executor.' 20 West Virginia Code section 44-5-5
(1982), however, authorizes the County Commission to require or
increase a bond of an executor. The purpose of the bond, of course, is
to assure the proper performance of the fiduciary's duties to the estate.
115. 174 S.E. 876, 877 (1934).
116. Id. at 878.
117. Id. at 877.
118. Id. at 878.
119. Id.
120. See W. VA. CODE §§ 44-1-7 to -8 (1982).
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3. Lis Pendens
If the estate contains valuable real estate, the executor or wrongful
will beneficiary may be able to sell the property to a bona fide pur-
chaser of value to the injury of the contestants. The practitioner should
consider placing a lien on the estate's real property. In order "to en-
force any lien upon, right to, or interest in designated real estate," a
party in a lawsuit may record a lis pendens to afford notice to pur-
chasers or encumbrancers of the real estate.'12  The West Virginia
Code provision is broad enough to allow a contestant in a will contest
who is claiming to succeed to title to the decedent's real property to
record a lis pendens and thereby tie up title to the property until the
will contest is settled or adjudicated.
2 2
4. Enlarging the Probate Estate Through Recovery of
Joint Bank Accounts1
2 3
An aspect of will contests often overlooked by the practitioner is
whether the proceeds in bank accounts registered jointly in the name
of the decedent and another person can be brought into the probate es-
tate. 124 West Virginia Code section 31A-4-33 (1988) provides gener-
ally that when a person deposits money into an account bearing the
name of the depositor and another or others, the funds thus deposited
are presumed to be the property of all persons whose names appear on
the account as joint tenants. The statute further provides that any funds
121. W. VA. CODE §§ 55-11-1 to -3 (1981). A lis pendens is recorded in the county
where the real estate is located.
122. Under the common law in force in West Virginia, title to real estate descends to
the heirs at law or will beneficiaries immediately upon death and does not pass thr6ugh the
hands of the personal representative. King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va. 1983); Gaylord
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 8 S.E.2d 189 (W. Va. 1940); see also McFaddin v. United
States, 10 F. Supp. 286 (Cl. Ct. 1935).
123. For a complete discussion of the law of joint bank accounts and other joint
tenancies, see John W. Fisher, II, Joint Tenancy in West Virginia: A Progressive Court
Looks at Traditional Property Rights, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 267 (1988-89).
124. The discussion here of joint bank accounts is not limited solely to the contestant
in a will contest. Executors, administrators, will beneficiaries, and, in appropriate cases,
intestate heirs, all have incentive to explore whether the probate estate can be enlarged. In
that respect, this section is equally applicable to them.
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in the joint account "may be paid to any one of [the joint tenants]
during the lifetime of them, or to the survivor or survivors after the
death of any of them."' 25
In addition to one narrow exception contained within the statute
itself,12 6 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has judi-
cially created limited exceptions to the statutory "joint tenancy" created
by Code section 31A-4-33 (1988). In Dorsey v. Short, 27 the court
construed Code section 31A-4-33 (1988) to mean that "in the absence
of fraud, mistake or other equally serious fault, a conclusive presump-
tion that the donor depositor of a joint and survivorship bank account
intended a causa mortis gift of the proceeds remaining in the account
after his death to the surviving joint tenant."
128
Furthermore, a presumption of constructive fraud may arise if the
parties to the joint account occupy a fiduciary
129 or confidential131
relationship. The constructive fraud presumption requires the person
who benefits from the account to bear the burden of proving that the
funds were a bona fide gift.' 31 In attacking the joint bank account,
which is otherwise a non-probate asset, the practitioner can enlarge the
pool of the contestant's potential recovery as well as the fund for the
potential attorney's fee.
125. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(b) (1988). A bank that pays money to a person in
accordance with this statute is released from any liability for the payment of such sums. Id.
at § 31A-4-33(c), (I). The practitioner should also note that the survivorship language on
the bank signatory card may be stricken if the depositor does not want to create an account
with survivorship.
126. W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-33(c) (1988) strips a bank of protection from liability if
the bank pays money over to a joint tenant when a depositor to a joint bank account ten-
ders written notice to the bank that funds in the account are not to be paid out in accor-
dance with the terms thereof.
127. 205 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1974).
128. Id. at 688 (emphasis supplied). The court's use of the term "causa mortis" has
been criticized. See Fisher, supra note 123. If a gift to the survivor is not intended by the
depositor, the account is sometimes called "an account of convenience."
129. Friend, 253 S.E.2d at 530.
130. Vercellotti v. Bowen, 371 S.E.2d 371 (W. Va. 1988).
131. Friend, 253 S.E.2d at 531; Vercellotti, 371 S.E.2d at 375.
[Vol. 96:123
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss1/6
WILL CONTESTS IN WEST VIRGINIA
5. Getting Paid: Common Fund Litigation
Many attorneys have excitedly begun investigating a potential will
contest on behalf of a disgruntled would-be contestant only to find that
the potential client's share of the estate if a contest is successful is
insufficient to support the time and expense involved in bringing a
case to trial. However, before rejecting a case as impractical on a fi-
nancial basis, the attorney should consider whether similarly situated
additional claimants exist. If so, the attorney's representation of the
potential client may be possible in spite of the small share the client
may receive.
If similarly situated heirs exist, the attorney may be able to invoke
the common fund doctrine to collect a fee from each heir benefitted
by the litigation whether that heir consented to the contest or not. The
doctrine permits a court to "order an allowance of counsel fees to a
[party] who at his own expense has maintained a successful suit for
the preservation, protection, or increase of a common fund or of com-
mon property, or who has created at his own expense, or brought into
court, a fund in which others may share with him."132 West Virginia
recognizes the common fund doctrine.
133
A court may award attorney's fees "when the other parties have
'stood by without counsel' and would reap the benefit of the services
rendered by the attorney conducting the proceeding."'134 Fees may al-
so be awarded when the legal services were "beneficial to the estate,
or necessary to its settlement."' 35 There is no set formula in West
Virginia for determining the amount of fees which an attorney may
132. 20 AM. JUR. 2d, Costs, § 84 (1965); see generally Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank,
307 U.S. 161 (1939).
133. Beuter v. Beuter, 7 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1940); Woods v. McClain, 166 S.E. 279
(W. Va. 1932); Weigand v. Alliance Supply Co., 28 S.E. 803 (W. Va. 1897).
134. Woods, 166 S.E. at 280 (quoting Roach v. Collieries Co., 160 S.E. 860 (W. Va.
1931)).
135. Syllabus, Beuter v. Beuter, 7 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 1940); see also Security Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Willim, 168 S.E.2d 555 (W. Va. 1969). In Wheeling Dollar Savings
and Trust Co. v. Leedy, 216 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1975), attorney's fees were denied in a
suit to construe a testamentary trust when the services were adversarial to the trust estate.
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recover. The court granting the fees has discretion to award the attor-
ney "reasonable compensation."
136
IV. RELATED ACTIONS INVOLVING ESTATES
In a will contest the central inquiry is the validity of the instru-
ment itself. Not all probate litigation, however, necessarily requires an
attack on a will. This Part provides a sampling of actions which are
not true will contests but which are so related to the distribution of
estate proceeds that discussion here is warranted in order to afford a
complete picture of counsel's litigation options in this area of law.
A. Tortious Interference
West Virginia recognizes the tort of tortious interference with a
testamentary bequest. 137 The Restatement (Second) of Torts at §
774B (1979) summarizes the tort as follows: "One who by fraud, du-
ress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiv-
ing from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise
have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheri-
tance or gift."
The elements of the tort do not require that the injured plaintiff be
related to the decedent since it has been held that a non-heir may
bring an action for tortious interference with a decedent's testamentary
disposition. 1 38 In order to recover, the plaintiff must show that (1)
she had the expectancy of a bequest or inheritance; (2) the defendants
intentionally interfered with her expectancy; (3) the interference in-
volved conduct tortious in itself such as fraud, duress, or undue influ-
ence; (4) there was a reasonable certainty that the bequest or inheri-
136. Beuter, 7 S.E.2d at 507.
137. Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1982).
138. See Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 425 N.E.2d 1187 (Ill. 1981) (allowing the stepchild of a
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tance would have been received but for the defendants' interference;
and (5) she suffered damages.
139
In West Virginia, the tort is independent of the right to contest a
will and is not within the probate jurisdiction of the county commis-
sion. 140 Federal courts can have diversity jurisdiction over claims for
tortious interference with a testamentary bequest.' 4'
B. Specific Perfonnance: Contracts to Make a Will
In a contract to make a will, the testator agrees to make provision
for another in his will. 42 For the contract to be enforceable, it must
be legally executed for valuable consideration. 143 Contracts to make
wills are controlled by the same rules as other contracts.144
To enforce a contract to make a will, the frustrated beneficiary
may file a suit for specific performance against the decedent's personal
representative. Technically, the relief granted is not specific perfor-
mance, since a court cannot direct performance against the decedent.
Equity, however, can compel the personal representative to convey the
decedent's property to the contract beneficiary.' 45 The statute of limi-
tations on such an action begins to run at the date of death.146 The
measure of damages is the sum stipulated or the value of the property
specified in the contract. 47 In determining the value of property such
value is the market value at the date of death.
148
139. Id. at 1191.
140. Barone, 294 S.E.2d at 264.
141. Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1975).
142. A decedent may also make a contract not to make a will, i.e., to die intestate.
Practitioners should also be aware that a testator may also make a "negative will." See,
e.g., W. VA. CODE § 42-1-1(44) (Supp. 1993). In a negative will, the testator specifies that
a named person shall in no event receive any property from his estate.
143. HARRISON, supra note 90, § 94.
144. Mullins v. Green, 105 S.E.2d 542 (W. Va. 1958).
145. See 20 M.J., Wills, § 184 (1979).
146. Ricks v. Sumler, 19 S.E.2d 889 (Va. 1942).
147. 20 M.J., Wills, § 183 (1979).
148. In re Murphy's Estate, 85 S.E.2d 836 (W. Va. 1955).
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A particular type of a contract to make a will is a "mutual will."
Mutual wills are wills executed pursuant to an agreement between the
testators to dispose of their property in a particular manner, each in
consideration of the other. 149 Mutual wills require a contract between
the parties.15 If the survivor accepts the benefits provided by the
will of the first decedent, the contract to make a will becomes en-
forceable and the survivor's will becomes "irrevocable.' 5' Technical-
ly, since revocability is an essential element of a will, a mutual will is
always revocable. Equity, however, will enforce the contract to make
the will which in essence will be "irrevocable."
15
V. CONCLUSION
Estate law reflects the policy that upon death a person should be
permitted to bequeath one's property as he.or she sees fit. 5 3 Howev-
er whimsical or ill-advised a person's will may be, the law will carry
out those wishes so long as the testator (1) followed the proper for-
malities, (2) knew what he had and what he was doing with it, and
(3) was not doing it because of the fraud or undue influence of anoth-
er.
This article has attempted to encapsulate the common grounds for
attacking a will in such situations and to provide some strategic guid-
ance and information on closely related actions. Each section herein
could itself be the subject of a worthwhile article. These comments
were designed as a starting gate, not the finish line, for the practitioner
who may be asked to run in a legal race known as a will contest.
149. Davis v. KB&T Co., 309 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1983). Mutual wills should not be
confused with reciprocal wills. Reciprocal wills are separate instruments in which the testa-
tors name each other as beneficiaries under similar estate plans. Reciprocal wills do not
necessarily have the contractual element required of mutual wills.
150. Id. at 48.
151. Wetzel v. Watson, 328 S.E.2d 526 (W. Va. 1985).
152. Id. at 529 n.3.
153. The one notable exception to this policy is the age-old effort to protect one
spouse from disinheriting the other. "For every determined effort . . . to prevent [spousal]
disinheritance, there have been equally determined efforts to accomplish exactly that." Scott
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